The Supreme Court has quashed the employment tribunal fees order (SI 2013/1893) because it has the effect of preventing access to justice. It is unlawful under both domestic and EU law.
The judgment is available here.
Employment law practitioners will find much to agree with in the judgment. It will also be of interest to constitutional scholars on account of its exposition of the constitutional right of access to the courts as a right inherent in the rule of law. The Supreme Court’s conclusions were based in the first instance on the common law.
This blog now simply sets out selected highlights from the judgment.—————————
¶18: “Counsel for the Lord Chancellor were unable to explain how any of the fees had been arrived at.”
¶36: “Many ET awards go unmet, even if enforcement proceedings are taken. A study carried out by the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, shortly before the introduction of fees, found that only 53% of claimants who were successful before the ET were paid even part of the award prior to taking enforcement action (“Payment of Tribunal Awards”, 2013). Even after enforcement action, only 49% of claimants were paid in full, with a further 16% being paid in part, and 35% receiving no money at all.”
¶39: “Although there are differences between the figures given in the different sources, the general picture is plain. Since the Fees Order came into force on 29 July 2013 there has been a dramatic and persistent fall in the number of claims brought in ETs. Comparing the figures preceding the introduction of fees with more recent periods, there has been a long-term reduction in claims accepted by ETs of the order of 66-70%.”
¶43: “The proportion of claimants receiving remission is therefore far lower than had been anticipated. The actual number is even lower, compared with what had been anticipated, given the difference between the number of claimants before and after the introduction of fees.”
¶56: Recovery of costs of operating the Tribunal service. “The recovery rates of 17% and 19% have been calculated without taking into account fee remissions. Once they are taken into account, the recovery rate in each of those years, on the figures given in the Review Report, was 13%.) Fees are thus making a much less significant contribution to costs recovery than had been expected.”
¶57: “the proportion of successful claims has been consistently lower since fees were introduced, while the proportion of unsuccessful claims has been consistently higher. The tribunal statistics, which record the figures for all claims, show the same trend. The Lord Chancellor accepts that there is no basis for concluding that only stronger cases are being litigated.”
¶59: “it appears that the proportion of cases settled through Acas has slightly decreased since fees were introduced. That is consistent with the view of commentators, noted in the Review Report, that some employers were delaying negotiations to see whether the claimant would be prepared to pay the fee.”
¶64: “The issue concerning the effect of the Fees Order on access to justice was argued before the courts below on the basis of EU law, although some domestic authorities and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights were also cited. Before this court, it has been recognised that the right of access to justice is not an idea recently imported from the continent of Europe, but has long been deeply embedded in our constitutional law. The case has therefore been argued primarily on the basis of the common law right of access to justice, although arguments have also been presented on the basis of EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights.”
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“The constitutional right of access to the courts
- The constitutional right of access to the courts is inherent in the rule of law. The importance of the rule of law is not always understood. Indications of a lack of understanding include the assumption that the administration of justice is merely a public service like any other, that courts and tribunals are providers of services to the “users” who appear before them, and that the provision of those services is of value only to the users themselves and to those who are remunerated for their participation in the proceedings. The extent to which that viewpoint has gained currency in recent times is apparent from the consultation papers and reports discussed earlier. It is epitomised in the assumption that the consumption of ET and EAT services without full cost recovery results in a loss to society, since “ET and EAT use does not lead to gains to society that exceed the sum of the gains to consumers and producers of these services”.
- It may be helpful to begin by explaining briefly the importance of the rule of law, and the role of access to the courts in maintaining the rule of law. It may also be helpful to explain why the idea that bringing a claim before a court or a tribunal is a purely private activity, and the related idea that such claims provide no broader social benefit, are demonstrably untenable.
- At the heart of the concept of the rule of law is the idea that society is governed by law. Parliament exists primarily in order to make laws for society in this country. Democratic procedures exist primarily in order to ensure that the Parliament which makes those laws includes Members of Parliament who are chosen by the people of this country and are accountable to them. Courts exist in order to ensure that the laws made by Parliament, and the common law created by the courts themselves, are applied and enforced. That role includes ensuring that the executive branch of government carries out its functions in accordance with the law. In order for the courts to perform that role, people must in principle have unimpeded access to them. Without such access, laws are liable to become a dead letter, the work done by Parliament may be rendered nugatory, and the democratic election of Members of Parliament may become a meaningless charade. That is why the courts do not merely provide a public service like any other.
- Access to the courts is not, therefore, of value only to the particular individuals involved. That is most obviously true of cases which establish principles of general importance. When, for example, Mrs Donoghue won her appeal to the House of Lords (Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562), the decision established that producers of consumer goods are under a duty to take care for the health and safety of the consumers of those goods: one of the most important developments in the law of this country in the 20th century. To say that it was of no value to anyone other than Mrs Donoghue and the lawyers and judges involved in the case would be absurd. The same is true of cases before ETs. For example, the case of Dumfries and Galloway Council v North [2013] UKSC 45; [2013] ICR 993, concerned with the comparability for equal pay purposes of classroom assistants and nursery nurses with male manual workers such as road workers and refuse collectors, had implications well beyond the particular claimants and the respondent local authority. The case also illustrates the fact that it is not always desirable that claims should be settled: it resolved a point of genuine uncertainty as to the interpretation of the legislation governing equal pay, which was of general importance, and on which an authoritative ruling was required.
- Every day in the courts and tribunals of this country, the names of people who brought cases in the past live on as shorthand for the legal rules and principles which their cases established. Their cases form the basis of the advice given to those whose cases are now before the courts, or who need to be advised as to the basis on which their claim might fairly be settled, or who need to be advised that their case is hopeless. The written case lodged on behalf of the Lord Chancellor in this appeal itself cites over 60 cases, each of which bears the name of the individual involved, and each of which is relied on as establishing a legal proposition. The Lord Chancellor’s own use of these materials refutes the idea that taxpayers derive no benefit from the cases brought by other people.
- But the value to society of the right of access to the courts is not confined to cases in which the courts decide questions of general importance. People and businesses need to know, on the one hand, that they will be able to enforce their rights if they have to do so, and, on the other hand, that if they fail to meet their obligations, there is likely to be a remedy against them. It is that knowledge which underpins everyday economic and social relations. That is so, notwithstanding that judicial enforcement of the law is not usually necessary, and notwithstanding that the resolution of disputes by other methods is often desirable.
- When Parliament passes laws creating employment rights, for example, it does so not merely in order to confer benefits on individual employees, but because it has decided that it is in the public interest that those rights should be given effect. It does not envisage that every case of a breach of those rights will result in a claim before an ET. But the possibility of claims being brought by employees whose rights are infringed must exist, if employment relationships are to be based on respect for those rights. Equally, although it is often desirable that claims arising out of alleged breaches of employment rights should be resolved by negotiation or mediation, those procedures can only work fairly and properly if they are backed up by the knowledge on both sides that a fair and just system of adjudication will be available if they fail. Otherwise, the party in the stronger bargaining position will always prevail. It is thus the claims which are brought before an ET which enable legislation to have the deterrent and other effects which Parliament intended, provide authoritative guidance as to its meaning and application, and underpin alternative methods of dispute resolution.
- A Lord Chancellor of a previous generation put the point in a nutshell, in a letter to the Treasury:
“(i) Justice in this country is something in which all the Queen’s subjects have an interest, whether it be criminal or civil.
(ii) The courts are for the benefit of all, whether the individual resorts to them or not.
(iii) In the case of the civil courts the citizen benefits from the interpretation of the law by the Judges and from the resolution of disputes, whether between the state and the individual or between individuals.”
(Genn, Judging Civil Justice (2010), p 46, quoting a letter written by Lord Gardiner in 1965)”.
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“The right of access to justice in the present case
- The 2007 Act does not state the purposes for which the power conferred by section 42(1) to prescribe fees may be exercised. There is however no dispute that the purposes which underlay the making of the Fees Order are legitimate. Fees paid by litigants can, in principle, reasonably be considered to be a justifiable way of making resources available for the justice system and so securing access to justice. Measures that deter the bringing of frivolous and vexatious cases can also increase the efficiency of the justice system and overall access to justice.
- The Lord Chancellor cannot, however, lawfully impose whatever fees he chooses in order to achieve those purposes. It follows from the authorities cited that the Fees Order will be ultra vires if there is a real risk that persons will effectively be prevented from having access to justice. That will be so because section 42 of the 2007 Act contains no words authorising the prevention of access to the relevant tribunals. That is indeed accepted by the Lord Chancellor.”
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¶91: “In order for the fees to be lawful, they have to be set at a level that everyone can afford, taking into account the availability of full or partial remission. The evidence now before the court, considered realistically and as a whole, leads to the conclusion that that requirement is not met.”
¶93: “The question whether fees effectively prevent access to justice must be decided according to the likely impact of the fees on behaviour in the real world. Fees must therefore be affordable not in a theoretical sense, but in the sense that they can reasonably be afforded. Where households on low to middle incomes can only afford fees by sacrificing the ordinary and reasonable expenditure required to maintain what would generally be regarded as an acceptable standard of living, the fees cannot be regarded as affordable.”
¶117: “Given the conclusion that the fees imposed by the Fees Order are in practice unaffordable by some people, and that they are so high as in practice to prevent even people who can afford them from pursuing claims for small amounts and non- monetary claims, it follows that the Fees Order imposes limitations on the exercise of EU rights which are disproportionate, and that it is therefore unlawful under EU law.”
¶119. “The Fees Order is unlawful under both domestic and EU law because it has the effect of preventing access to justice. Since it had that effect as soon as it was made, it was therefore unlawful ab initio, and must be quashed.”
¶120: “The parties are invited to make written submissions on any consequential relief which may be appropriate in these circumstances.”
Tom Ogg, 11KBW